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Bid prices for the demand and supply of water allocations between 2001 and 2007, and
average monthly prices paid for water allocations from 1997 to 2007 in the Goulburn–
Murray Irrigation District are analysed to estimate price elasticities. Based on bid
prices, the price elasticity of demand for water allocations appears highly elastic, with
elasticities strongly inﬂuenced by the season and drought. The price elasticity of supply
for water allocations is also elastic, albeit less elastic than demand. Using actual prices
paid, water demand is negatively related to price and is inelastic, and appears to be








In an era of ﬁxed supply and general scarcity, the use of economic instruments
to manage demand for water has increasingly been promoted by international
organisations such as the UN, the World Bank and the OECD. Since 1994
Australia has promoted markets as an integral part of agricultural water manage-
ment. Compared to most other countries, markets in water allocations (also known
as temporary water markets, these involve the right to short-term use of water)
have developed to a high level of maturity. By contrast, markets for water
entitlements (also known as permanent water markets, these involve the long-
term right to access water), as in other countries, have been more subdued as
irrigators perceive water entitlements as an inherent part of the farm (Tisdell
and Ward 2003). Farmers can buy and sell water on a temporary basis, or on a
permanent basis, depending on their perceived needs. Prices in the two markets
have increased considerably over time and the two prices are closely linked,
following the same cyclical pattern but with allocation prices ﬂuctuating
more than twice as much as entitlement prices (Bjornlund and Rossini 2007).
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Understanding irrigators’ responsiveness to changes in water prices is an
essential element when evaluating the effectiveness of using water markets as
a policy instrument. Despite agricultural water markets being in existence for
some 20 years in Australia, there have been relatively few attempts to estimate
the price elasticity of traded water allocations or entitlements or to identify
the factors impacting on volumes traded in such markets. This is mainly
because of a paucity of water pricing data, ‘thin’ markets in many areas and
the private nature of price information. To overcome these obstacles this
paper combines publicly available price and quantity data from the Goulburn–
Murray Irrigation District (GMID) in Northern Victoria, with information
from the major water broker in the region. The result is a consistent time-
series of prices and volumes traded in the market for agricultural water
allocations in Australia’s largest irrigation district.
 
2. The study region and water trading background
 
The GMID is located in Northern Victoria along the River Murray. Irrigation
within the district is mainly supplied by two major sources: the Goulburn
and the Murray Rivers. Initially, trade in this region, in both the markets for





By July 2004, fewer than one in ﬁve farm businesses within the GMID had
never traded any type of water, and in many areas the ﬁgure was below one
in 10. During the very dry seasons of 2002–03 and 2003–04, 60 per cent of
all farm businesses were active in buying or selling allocations or entitlements
(Bjornlund 2006). Water purchased in the allocation market, as a percentage
of total water use within the GMID, has increased from about three per cent
during periods of high supply in the mid-1990s, to almost a quarter in 2002–
03 (Table 1). These are clear signs of increased market adoption among water
Table 1 Volume traded as percentage of water use – the Goulburn and Murray Systems
Season
Goulburn System Murray System
Allocation (%)* % of trade† Allocation (%)* % of trade†
1995–96 150 7 200 3
1996–97 200 4 200 3
1997–98 120 9 130 13
1998–99 100 13 200 5
1999–2000 100 14 200 8
2000–01 100 16 200 2
2001–02 100 18 200 5
2002–03 57 24 129 16
2003–04 100 16 100 18
2004–05 100 18 100 22
2005–06 100 22 144 14
2006–07 29 37 95 20
*Maximum seasonal allocation; †total water trade for season as percentage of total water use.
Source: Based on Goulburn–Murray Water’s Records. 
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users. Dairy, fruit and grape producers are the most signiﬁcant buyers in the
water allocations market, whereas cereal, grazing and mixed farmers are the
main sellers (Bjornlund and Rossini 2005, 2007).
At the beginning of each growing season (August), the local water authority
announces an initial opening allocation of water – an amount each irrigator
has by way of entitlement ownership. The initial allocation is a percentage of an
irrigator’s full entitlement, and is based on water availability in the storages.
Allocations are progressively revised during the season as, or if, more water
becomes available until ﬁnal allocations are known, normally by February. In
most years, irrigators within the Goulburn System have received their full
allocation (Table 1), with the exception of the severe drought years of 2002–
03 and 2006–07. In the recent drought year of 2006–07, opening allocations
were 0 per cent and by December had increased to 24 per cent, with a closing
allocation of 29 per cent within the Goulburn System. To use water beyond their
allocation, irrigators can purchase water allocations from other irrigators. In
general, the volume of water traded has been increasing over time (see Figure 1).
In 1998, after increasing demands for a faster approval process, Goulburn–
Murray Water, the authority administering the GMID introduced a weekly
water exchange. This allowed traders to bid for water on a Monday and get
access to use the water on the Friday of the same week (Bjornlund 2003). In
2003, the exchange was extended to cover all of Victoria and the Murray
Region of New South Wales. These multiple exchanges were gathered under the
umbrella of WaterMove (www.watermove.au). Brennan (2006) provides more
information on the Victorian water market and its operations.
WaterMove conducts water exchanges within a number of speciﬁed trading
zones. Of the many regions covered by WaterMove, this study concentrates
on the largest and most active zone; the Greater Goulburn trading zone
within the Northern Victoria Regulated region. The exchange facilitates
transactions in a number of ‘products’ including: Temporary Water Rights/
Figure 1 Volume traded in the allocation market in the GMID from 1989–90 to 2006–07.
Source: Based on the records of Goulburn–Murray Water. 
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Diversion Licenses (here called water allocations), Temporary Sales, Permanent
Used Water Rights/Diversion Licenses and Permanent Unused Water Rights/
Diversion Licenses. Trading typically occurs 10 months in every year (except
June and July, the wettest months). The exchange operates as follows: buyers
and sellers submit their bids to buy (sell) on a weekly basis. The bids must
include the amount that they are prepared to buy (sell) and the price at which
they are willing to buy (sell) the water. The exchanges are held every Thursday
and the rules stipulate that the buyers be stacked in descending price order
with the highest bidder eligible to buy ﬁrst. The sellers are stacked in ascending
order, with the lowest bidder eligible to sell ﬁrst. The pool price is set at the
level where the maximum volume is traded while no buyer pays more than
their bid and no seller receives less than their bid. The pool price is the same
for all successful buyers and sellers with some buyers paying less and some
sellers receiving more than their bids.
This study analysed trade in the Temporary Water rights/Diversion License
market, because it is the most active market. Yearly data on the volumes of
water allocations traded is available from 1989 to 1990 (Figure 1), and monthly
average prices paid for water allocations are available from July 1993 (Figure 2).
The annual volume of water traded has increased from less than 50 000 ML
in 1989 to almost 350  000  ML by 2007, a seven-fold increase. While the
quantity of water traded has steadily increased, prices have been much more
variable, inﬂuenced by seasonal conditions such as the drought in 2002–03.


















ML in 2002–03, and fell again during the seasons of 2003–04 to 2005–06
Figure 2 Monthly average pool prices paid for water allocations in the Greater Goulburn
from 1993–94 to 2006–07.
Source: PlanRight, Tatura 1993–98, Water Exchange 1998–2007. 
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before skyrocketing in 2006–07. Large variations are also reﬂected in the
weekly pool price and quantity traded. For example, in 2002–03, the weekly








105/ML; the maximum quantity
traded in a week was over 2500 ML and the minimum under 200 ML. In









while the quantity traded each week ranged from over 4000  ML to only





December while the accumulated volume traded at that time exceeded any
other year and the volume traded in one single exchange was over 13 800 ML.
As a consequence of WaterMove’s transaction procedures, consumer
surplus (i.e. represented by the proxy of the difference between what the
buyer bids for water and what they actually pay for it) is highest for the buyer
who bids the highest price and then only pays the ‘pool’ price. This implies
that a ‘demand’ curve for water constructed from the offer bids may contain
spurious bids because of strategic behaviour from buyers to ensure a position
on the top of the demand schedule. Such bidders are likely to know that the
‘pool price’ that they pay will be lower than their bid price, and that their
bidding strategy will have little or no impact on the ﬁnal pool price. Never-
theless, this study uses all the weekly supply and demand bids to construct
bid curves for the six years from 2001–02 to 2006–07 in order to calculate
price elasticities of water allocations.
 
2.1 Price elasticity literature review
 
The elasticity of demand for a product is deﬁned as the percentage change in
demand in response to a unit change in its price. Since, for a normal good,
there is an inverse relationship between price and quantity demanded, the
elasticity of demand is usually negative and the elasticity of supply is usually
positive, as price goes up so should quantity supplied.
Elasticity estimates are sensitive to the method used to estimate them. In a




. (2006) present a meta-analysis of 24 studies on
irrigation water demand in the United States. Estimates are more elastic if
they are derived from econometric studies or based on mathematical pro-
gramming and less elastic if derived from models based on ﬁeld experiments.
Their work reveals a mean price elasticity of 0.48 and a median of 0.16 (in
absolute terms), with larger elasticities in the longer run. They also reveal a
large variation in the results, with elasticities ranging from 0.001 to 1.97.
Overall, irrigation water demand elasticities seem slightly more elastic than
residential water demand elasticities (i.e. Grafton and Kompas 2007 estimated
a residential price elasticity of water demand for Sydney to be –0.35).
This variation in results highlights the difﬁculties of estimating water price





. highlight that: (i) studies differ in whether they
assume that all other inputs (other than water) are held constant; (ii) water
demand is more elastic at higher prices; (iii) studies vary in the range of 
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prices and the time frame (and hence the opportunity for irrigators to alter
behaviour) they study; (iv) the type of response that irrigators make to
increasing prices (e.g. moving to higher value crops) in itself affects the value
of additional water and the shape of their demand curve; (v) the mix of low,
medium and high value crops covered in particular studies varies (different
elasticities are associated with crop value); (vi) differences in climate impact
on production functions; and (vii) the actual data used varies from study to
study. In addition, we would highlight that not all water ‘markets’ are the
same (with variation in the degree of regulation, utilisation, acceptance and
efﬁciency of the market) and that many price elasticity studies are based on
the price that water supply authorities charge to supply water (normally
heavily subsidised) and not on prices paid in water markets.




. (1990) showed increasing
the water price impacted positively on the adoption of water conservation




. (1998) showed that such effects are
related to the potential of diversiﬁcation, water allocation and risk of water
delivery. Others stipulate that an increase in water price may induce positive
responses only in the range of prices where the demand is elastic (de Fraiture and
Perry 2002) and that such price ranges often will be outside what is politically
feasible (Perry 2001). For example, de Fraiture and Perry (2002) found that
water demand is inelastic at low price ranges and became elastic only after a
certain threshold price, suggesting that price increases in the order of 5–10
times were needed to induce water saving behaviour. They suggested that there




. (2006) found that water demand is more elastic than previously thought
if considering the impact of higher marginal water prices on both the choice
of crop or fallowing and on the choice of irrigation technology. Gomez-Limon
and Riesgo (2004) found in Spain that within even homogeneous areas in
terms of soil, climate and other factors, there are signiﬁcant differences among
farmers’ reactions to price changes due to the variability in management
criteria used to plan their crop mixes.
In Australia, given the limited number of market transactions and the lack
of pricing information, most previous research has used mathematical pro-
gramming models to derive price elasticities for water. This approach ﬁrst
estimates the value of the marginal product of water in an agricultural pro-




. 2004). It then estimates the optimal response of
an individual to changes in the price of water under varying parameters,
assuming they choose rationally. The literature also suggests, however, that
irrigators’ responses to pricing and other policy instruments are driven by
many factors other than just ﬁnancial considerations and are therefore not
always economically rational (Gomez-Limon and Riesgo 2004; Kuehne and
Bjornlund 2006). Consistent with the international ﬁndings, all estimates of
Australian price elasticities based on mathematical programming have found
the demand for irrigation water to be very inelastic at low prices. Short-run
elasticity estimates range from –0.02 to –2.81, depending on the range of 
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From an analysis of large-scale farm survey information for a variety of




. (2007) report water demand elasticities from
–0.8 to –1.9. Broadacre industries were more responsive to water prices than




. (2007) found that a 1 per cent increase in the likelihood of farms trading
water was associated with a 2 per cent increase in farms gross operating surplus.
The lack of information on individual’s explicit demand for water has
meant that previous estimates of elasticity have only considered average




. 2006). In this




average prices paid to calculate elasticities. The only other analyses that have
been conducted on the entire demand and supply bid curves are Brooks and




. (2004). Brooks and Harris (2005) estimated
simple weekly demand and supply price elasticities for water allocations for
the Greater Goulburn, Barmah-Nyah and Hume-Barmah zones from mid-
2002 to March 2005. They estimated the average demand elasticity at 3.20,
and the average supply elasticity at 3.50 for the Greater Goulburn trading




. (2004) estimated weekly price
elasticities in the Goulburn–Murray for 2002–03. Both of these studies
produced a wide range of elasticity estimates, mostly because of thin trading
in some weeks. Our study avoids this problem by using different model
speciﬁcations and using data that cover a longer time period.
 
3. Results
3.1 Bid price elasticities of demand and supply
 
Water demand functions have traditionally used linear, log–log or log–linear





. 2006). A variety of models were tested and the log–log
functional form is presented here. Demand and supply price elasticities are
calculated on six years of weekly allocation trading from July 2001 to June







 is the time period, DML is the water allocation volume demanded by
buyers in ML for that week, SML is the volume offered by suppliers in that
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week, DPrice is the dollar amount offered per ML by buyers, SPrice is the
dollar amount sought per ML by sellers. It is anticipated that there will be a
negative relationship between prices and water demand, and a positive relation-
ship between prices and water supplied. Alloc is the current allocation level
of irrigation water in that week. It is hypothesised that farmers base their
water demand and supply decisions on their current level of water allocation.
Previous analyses of prices and volumes traded in the allocation market sug-
gest that the main drivers of activities are low allocations and an increasing
accumulated net deﬁcit of water (i.e. Bjornlund 2003; Bjornlund and Rossini
2005; Brennan 2006). Drought is a dummy for the two severe drought years
of 2002–03 and 2006–07, and it is hypothesised that during severe drought
more water will be traded in the market as high value users (those whose crop
values justiﬁes purchasing water) will have to purchase a larger proportion of
their total water need. Year is a continuous variable for the trading year in
the database to detect if there is a time trend or some effect associated with a
developing regional water market over time. Month is a series of dummies for
the months in the trading year, to allow for seasonality factors. For example,
some farmers delay buying water until they have used their seasonal alloca-
tion and ﬁnd that their crop still needs water. They do this in the hope that
that opening winter rains arrive early, or that prices will be lower later in the
season, as has historically been the case in several seasons (Bjornlund 2003).
Note too, that a variety of different seasonality variables were tested, such as
month number, a quadratic factor for month and dummies for seasons, however,
these variables had problems with collinearity. In another model speciﬁcation
price and month (plus price and month for each year) were interacted
together to illustrate seasonality effects over the entire time period.
In this study, there are 17  713 observations in the demand model and
19 711 in the supply model; the entire set of available individual offers to buy
and sell a given volume of water at a given price. Results for models one and
two are displayed in Table 2 (with descriptive statistics and the results for
other speciﬁcations in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix I).
Table 2 illustrates that for the period from 2001–02 to 2006–07, the demand
bid elasticity for water allocations is estimated to be –1.51, and the supply bid
elasticity is estimated to be 0.89. Demand for water allocations is higher in
drought years (while unsurprisingly the supply of water is less). When allocations
of water increase, the demand for water falls, while over the years there has
been a decrease in the amount of water demanded by bidders in the market –
suggesting perhaps that outlandish demand bids have lessened in number as
markets have become more developed or that buyers of water have become more
efﬁcient with their water use. On the other hand, there has been an increase in the
supply of water by bidders in the market over time (shown by the Year variable).
There is a deﬁnite seasonal pattern in the model, with water demand generally
increasing each month from the start of the trading year (August) until
demand becomes less in May and June. The supply of water on the other hand
is higher at the start of the trading year, and falls throughout most of the year. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the monthly patterns of supply and demand elasticities
in each year (obtained from the regressions reported in Table A2 in Appendix I)
as well as the simple average demand and supply elasticity pattern across all
six years. The monthly supply and demand elasticities were calculated by
summing the coefﬁcient of the price variable and the coefﬁcient of the
interaction term between time and price together. The resultant relatively
stable seasonal pattern is consistent with the decision making pattern in
the allocation water market identiﬁed through surveys (Bjornlund 2006). The
price elasticity of monthly bid demand ranged from –1.71 to –4.14. As the
lower panel shows, the average demand-bid price elasticity is in the elastic
range through the entire season. It is lowest in the ﬁrst trading month of the
year while the market is dominated by more well-off and more conservative
farmers buying what they need for the season. Demand bid elasticity remains
relatively constant until March when it becomes more elastic, and it drops
dramatically in June. From this point demand is normally only driven by
irrigators’ need to balance their water account for the season to avoid paying




1000/ML for excess use.
The upper panel shows that the average supply offer price elasticity is also
in the elastic range for the whole season (although some years do vary) and very
Table 2 Demand and Supply Bid Price Elasticities in the GMID for the period 2001–02 to
2006–07
Demand Supply
Variable Coefﬁcient SE Variable Coefﬁcient SE
ln DPrice −1.51 0.02*** ln SPrice 0.89 0.03***
ln Alloc −1.71 0.06*** ln Alloc −−
Drought 0.88 0.06*** Drought −2.30 0.05***
Year −0.31 0.01*** Year 0.02 0.01***
Sep. 0.53 0.04*** Sep. −1.06 0.10***
Oct. 0.96 0.05*** Oct. −0.91 0.10***
Nov. 0.95 0.06*** Nov. −0.75 0.10***
Dec. 0.83 0.06*** Dec. −1.11 0.10***
Jan. 1.43 0.05*** Jan. −0.62 0.10***
Feb. 0.96 0.06*** Feb. −0.56 0.10***
March 1.18 0.06*** March −0.29 0.10***
Apr. 0.92 0.06*** Apr. −0.81 0.10***
May −0.17 0.07** May −0.41 0.10***
June −2.14 0.31*** June −3.50 0.30***
Constant 21.63 0.27*** Constant 4.24 0.13***




F test 718.90*** F test 316.33***
Notes: All models calculated with Huber–White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and
covariance and with bias correction best for heteroskedasticity. Due to collinearity problems, allocation
could not be used in the supply model (Note: R
2 was still signiﬁcantly lower than the R
2 for the Demand
model when it was included).
***Signiﬁcant at 1% level. **Signiﬁcant at 5% level.46 S. Wheeler et al.
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd
gradually increases over the season until March, and becomes less elastic
after May. The price elasticity of monthly supply for water allocations ranged
from 0.84 to 2.84. Such an effect may be illustrating that in the beginning of
the season the supply side is dominated by people who are selling all or a
substantial part of their water each year (in effect their farming output is
water) and which in turn depends on their early season cash-ﬂow. Supply
elasticity then slowly increases as low value active irrigators consider whether
they will be better off selling their water or growing a crop. Elasticity reaches
its highest points in summer when supply is provided either by speculative
water sellers or by irrigators abandoning lower valued crops. The mean
elasticity rises again in April to May as irrigators sell what they do not
need in order to recover unavoidable supply costs. Thereafter the elasticity of
supply falls.
In order to test whether the supply (or demand) bid price elasticities vary
across time (e.g. the null hypothesis is either supply (demand) price elasticity
is the same for every September from year 2001–02 to 2006–07 or supply
(demand) price elasticity is the same for every month in a single year), we
performed Chow tests and the results show that we can reject the null
hypotheses at the one per cent signiﬁcance level, hence elasticities were vary-
ing across time. The test results are not reported here due to space limit but
are available upon request.
Water allocations demand-bid price elasticities are more elastic than water
allocations supply bid price elasticities, both within season and across years
(signiﬁcant at the one per cent level). However, demand-bid elasticities ﬂuctuate
more signiﬁcantly than supply bid elasticities within the season, but not
across seasons. This may be because the demand side is dominated by active
Figure 3 Monthly Demand and Supply Bid Price Elasticities in the market for Water
Allocations in Greater Goulburn Region from 2001–02 to 2006–07.Price elasticity of water allocations in the GMID 47
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irrigators adjusting their trading activities during the season and from season
to season in response to changing rainfall, evaporation, allocation levels and
market conditions. On the other hand, supply offer elasticities ﬂuctuate less
so within the season as the supply side is dominated by farmers selling all their
water each year and lower-value producing farmers who make the decision to
sell their water early in the season. Such elasticities may ﬂuctuate across seasons
more given irrigators overriding need for water because of season conditions.
Similar to demand-offer elasticities, supply-offer elasticities ﬂuctuate the most
early and late in the season (i.e. in the ﬁrst three months and the last two
months) as farmers decide whether to sell or irrigate and while water sellers
try to read the market and ﬁnd out when it will be most proﬁtable to sell.
One of the reasons elasticities ﬂuctuate so much towards the end of the season
is due to the small number of bid offers (which is reﬂected in the lack of
signiﬁcance of a couple of May and June interaction effects). Overall, our
models explained the variance in demand for water allocations more so than
the supply of water allocations. Such a result suggests that buying and selling
water is quite a different activity for most farmers, and that more detailed
individual level analysis (such as derived from farm surveys) is needed to sug-
gest the real drivers of why farmers are selling water allocations.
The drought years of 2002–03 and 2006–07 produced monthly elasticity
patterns different from other years. Demand and supply elasticities in drought
years were much less elastic than in other years (as shown in Figure 3), and
were both below the average yearly seasonal elasticity. Supply became inelastic
in the last couple of trading months of 2006–07, reﬂecting the severity and
the continuation of the drought. This is unlike the monthly demand and supply
elasticities for 2002–03 which both regressed towards the average from April
onwards (most likely because farmers knew that they would most likely be
receiving their full allocation the following trading year given rainfall received).
It is expected that both supply and demand elasticities will become more
inelastic in the current year of 2007–08.
3.2 Average monthly price elasticities of water allocation demand
The previous two sections have considered price bid elasticities of demand
and supply water allocations. It is important to note, however, that these are
based on weekly individual offers and bids incorporating the entire range of
values signalling willingness to pay and minimum acceptable prices – but
not what traders actually paid and received. This section calculates price
elasticities of demand for water for the longer period of 1997–98 to 2006–07
utilising average monthly prices paid for water allocations and, given
increased monthly data availability, takes into consideration a wider range of
possible inﬂuences on the demand for water. Prior to 1997 volumes traded
are only available on an annual basis.
The demand for rural water is traditionally expressed as a function of
price, income and other factors. The preferred model would express each48 S. Wheeler et al.
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farmer’s demand for water as a function of a range of their farm and socio-
economic characteristics over time, and future research should consider such
an analysis. In this paper, however, given the limited available data, a region-
level model is speciﬁed where the monthly total quantity of water allocations
(WAVol) purchased by farmers in the GMID is the dependent variable. Apart
from the independent variables used in our weekly bid elasticity models, other
inﬂuences hypothesised to inﬂuence rural water demand were also included
in the model: farm income, commodity prices, lagged demand, and a variable
encompassing rainfall and evaporation factors.
(3)
The variables for drought, year and month are as deﬁned in the ﬁrst models
(1) and (2). The ﬁrst independent variable DATPricet is the average price for
water allocations in the current month. The second independent variable
WAVol t–1 represents lagged demand for water, as it is expected that the current
month’s demand is related to that from the previous month. Including such
a term allows for the estimation of the long-run price elasticity (Hoffman
et al. 2006). The third independent variable NDKyabt is the net monthly
water deﬁcit in the region. This is calculated by subtracting monthly rainfall
from monthly evaporation rates obtained form the Bureau of Meteorology
for the Kyabram station. This variable is a proxy for the volume of water that the
irrigators must apply additional to the needs of the plant. It is hypothesised
that an increase in the net water deﬁcit (i.e. more water is evaporating from
the soil than is being replaced by rainfall), will lead to an increased demand
for water. Brennan (2006) found a negative relationship between rainfall and
prices, while Bjornlund and Rossini (2005) found a positive relationship
between evaporation and prices in the Goulburn region’s water allocation
market. The fourth independent variable FarmGDPt is the average monthly
farm GDP as estimated by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). It is
hypothesised that farm GDP (which is a proxy for income of farmers) will be
positively related to water demand. The eighth independent variable MAlloct
is the current monthly allocation level of irrigation water. The remaining vari-
ables (PriceFBt, PriceWht and PriceWot) are unit export commodity prices for
feed barley, wheat and wool (provided by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural
Resource Economics). (It should be noted too that a wide variety of agri-
cultural prices were collected and tested – but none displayed any signiﬁcance
in the tested model.) Previous studies have found that water demand is posi-
tively related to commodity prices, although they appear to be less important
than water scarcity (Bjornlund and Rossini 2005; Brennan 2006). Bjornlund
and Rossini (2005) suggest that when prices on the allocation market increased
to #500/ML in 2002–03 this was caused by horticultural farmers protecting
their long-term investments in plantings, with dairy farmers protecting their
ln          ln       ln        
    ln                  
   ln        
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long-term investments in dairy herd and milking equipment at prices up to
around #300/ML. Taking a long-term position, it is rational for farmers to pay
more for water than appears proﬁtable in the short-run. There is also anecdotal
evidence of banks lending money to dairy farmers to purchase water at loss
making prices to ensure their long-term ability to service debt.
Table A1 in Appendix I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics (in
terms of means, maximums, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis) for
the average price monthly model from July 1997 to June 2007.
Table 3 presents the results of various speciﬁcations of the model with
101 monthly observations in each. In the original speciﬁcation of the model
(OLS), the price variable for temporary water was found to be endogenous.
As a result, its coefﬁcient was positive (albeit) insigniﬁcant. There were also
problems with collinearity. The model was respeciﬁed with 2SLS, with
Table 3 Demand for Monthly Water Allocations (DML) in the GMID from 1997 to 2006
using OLS and 2SLS
Variable
OLS 2SLS
Coefﬁcient SE Coefﬁcient SE
ln WAPrice 0.05 0.10 −0.52 0.27**
ln WAVolt–1 0.35 0.09*** 0.36 0.09***
NDKyab 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00
ln FarmGDP 1.13 0.78 1.45 0.73**
Drought 0.85 0.33*** 1.40 0.51***
Year 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03
Sep. 2.26 0.26*** 2.30 0.23***
Oct. 1.56 0.27*** 1.67 0.24***
Nov. 1.41 0.31*** 1.60 0.27***
Dec. 1.57 0.38*** 1.83 0.35***
Jan. 1.86 0.41*** 2.15 0.38***
Feb. 2.03 0.34*** 2.17 0.32***
Mar. 2.16 0.35*** 2.27 0.33***
Apr. 2.03 0.30*** 1.98 0.31***
May 1.49 0.28*** 1.06 0.38***
June 0.31 0.32 −0.26 0.41
ln MAlloc 0.12 0.16 − –
ln PriceFB −1.14 0.70** − –
ln PriceWh 0.43 0.69 − –
ln PriceWo 0.44 0.56 − –
Constant −4.39 7.18 −6.25 6.56
n 101 n 101
Adjusted R
2 0.82 Centered R
2 0.80





Pagan–Hall General stat 9.72
Notes: ***Signiﬁcant at 1% level. **Signiﬁcant at 5% level. *Signiﬁcant at 10% level.50 S. Wheeler et al.
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ln PriceFB, ln PriceWh, ln PriceWo and ln Alloc acting as instrumental
variables for ln WAPricet, and was calculated with robust standard errors. The
selection of these instruments satisﬁes the criteria that they are correlated
with ln  WAPricet, and they are exogenous of the monthly water demand
equation. Tests of over-identiﬁcation and endogeneity were also undertaken,
which showed that our model was appropriately speciﬁed and no longer
suffered from endogeneity of ln WAPrice. With regard to the possible serial
correlation of the error term in our model, the estimator we used accounted
for the ﬁrst order autocorrelation function of the error term. Stationarity of
the dependent variable and regressors was thought not to be a concern in our
ﬁnal model given the model’s 2SLS estimation, as pointed out by Hsiao (1997).
The analysis shows that average demand for water allocations is signiﬁcantly
and positively inﬂuenced by demand in the previous month, farm GDP,
seasonality factors and drought.
The price of water allocations in the current month was negatively and
signiﬁcantly related to water demand. The short-run elasticity is calculated at
the means, and the long-run elasticity is calculated from the lagged demand
coefﬁcient at the mean. The short-run price elasticity of water demand at the
mean is –0.52 while the long-run price elasticity of demand at the mean is
–0.81. This indicates that a 10 per cent increase in the price of water allocations
decreases the demand for water allocations by 5.2 per cent in the short-run
and 8.1 per cent in the long-run. Although the price of water does play a role
in limiting its demand, other factors such as seasonality factors and drought
would appear to be more important in inﬂuencing the average monthly demand
for water allocations. During periods of drought irrigators’ demand for water
is high while supply in the form of seasonal allocations is low. High value irri-
gators are therefore willing to pay high prices to avoid losing their plantings
or dairy herds and to stay in business and as a result water demand is inelastic
overall.
4. Conclusion and policy recommendations
This paper has provided several estimates of the elasticity of demand and
supply for water allocations for one region along the Murray River in Australia
over the period 1997–2007. Based on traders’ bids for water allocations on
WaterMove, the price elasticities of bid demand by month ranged from –1.71 to
–4.14, while the overall price elasticity of demand ranged from –1.51 to –1.99.
The monthly price elasticities of supply for water allocations ranged from
0.84 to 2.84, while the overall price elasticity of supply ranged from 0.89 to
1.79. Our models explained the variance in demand for water allocations more
so than the variance in supply of water. Elasticity varies over the trading season,
which suggests that the elasticity of demand and supply for water is highly
dependent upon the time of the season and market prices. It was also found
that demand elasticity was highest and ﬂuctuated the most within a given year,
and that it became very elastic towards the end of the season. This suggestsPrice elasticity of water allocations in the GMID 51
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that active irrigators responding to ﬂuctuating weather and market conditions
are dominating the demand side. On the other hand water sellers and lower
value producing irrigators deciding to sell all or a large proportion of their
water early in the season and the high need for water because of drought
conditions dominate the supply side.
Our more comprehensive model of water allocations demand (this time using
actual water traded against actual prices paid) over the time period from
1997 to 2007, found that once price was corrected for endogeneity, demand
elasticity was estimated to be between –0.52 in the short-run and –0.81 in the
long-run, with seasonality factors and drought again playing the largest
inﬂuence on water demand. It is clear from these results that elasticities vary
considerably, with those calculated from bid estimates much more elastic
than those from average monthly prices. Such a result is to be expected given
the structure of Watermove’s bids and the average monthly price paid for
water allocations.
It is clear there is a need for more and better studies of water demand and
supply elasticities. Current government policies that use markets to reallocate
scare water resources depend on irrigators to respond to price signals. On the
whole, it seems that average demand for water allocations in the GMID has
been inelastic over the period from 1997 to 2007. Inelastic responses or
responses that indicate that it will take decades to reallocate water volumes
effectively signal the ineffectiveness of such policies. This in turn requires
that governments have a clear target as to the aggregate amount of water
they wish to see reallocated. Not only will this require better information
about aggregate ﬂows, such policies require a clear differentiation between
(and measurement of) water consumption and water distribution elasticities.
Our results suggest that the continuing pressure on water supply and alloca-
tions from the current drought may lead to a decrease in supply and demand
water allocations elasticities across the region. Further research in this area
will be needed.
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Appendix I
Table A1 Descriptive Statistics of variables used in regressions
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Demand Bid Price Weekly Model
ln DML 7.56 1.37 −0.69 10.40
ln DPrice 4.86 0.88 2.20 7.31
ln Alloc 4.09 0.68 1.61 4.61
Aug. 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Sep. 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Oct. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Nov. 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Dec. 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Jan. 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Feb. 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
Mar. 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Apr. 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
May 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Jun. 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00
Year 3.19 1.86 1.00 6.00
Drought 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Supply Bid Price Weekly Model
ln SML 7.04 1.33 −0.36 9.82
ln SPrice 4.96 1.05 −0.69 7.31
ln Alloc 4.08 0.64 1.61 4.61
Aug. 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Sep. 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Oct. 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Nov. 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
Dec. 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Jan. 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Feb. 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Mar. 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Apr. 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
May 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
June 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00
Year 3.64 1.69 1.00 6.00
Drought 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Monthly Average Price Model
ln WAVol 9.81 1.03 6.68 11.42
NDKyab 106.99 88.21 –37.50 288.70
ln GDPf 8.66 0.11 8.37 8.81
Year 5.65 2.89 1.00 10.00
Drought 0.20 0.41 0.00 1.00
ln WAPrice 4.43 0.97 2.38 6.77
ln MAlloc 4.29 0.60 1.61 4.79
ln PriceFB 5.26 0.28 4.81 5.87
ln PriceWh 5.47 0.13 5.25 5.82
ln PriceWo 6.62 0.20 6.18 7.07
Sep. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Oct. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Nov. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Dec. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Jan. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Feb. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Mar. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Apr. 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
May 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
June 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.0054 S. Wheeler et al.
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Table A2 Demand and Supply Bid Price Seasonality Elasticities (with time and price
interactions) in the GMID for the period 2001–02 to 2006–07
Demand Bid Supply Bid
Variable Coefﬁcient SE Variable Coefﬁcient SE
ln DPrice −1.99 0.04*** ln SPrice 1.79 0.05***
ln Alloc −1.16 0.07*** ln Alloc −−
ln DPSepy1 −0.58 0.03*** ln SPSepy1 0.42 0.02***
ln DPSepy2 0.19 0.02*** ln SPSepy2 −0.16 0.02***
ln DPSepy3 −0.15 0.03*** ln SPSepy3 −0.13 0.01***
ln DPSepy4 −0.62 0.02*** ln SPSepy4 0.20 0.02***
ln DPSepy5 −0.47 0.04*** ln SPSepy5 0.29 0.03***
ln DPSepy6 0.12 0.01*** ln SPSepy6 −0.31 0.01***
ln DPOcty1 −0.41 0.03*** ln SPOcty1 0.48 0.03***
ln DPOcty2 0.31 0.02*** ln SPOcty2 −0.32 0.01***
ln DPOcty3 −0.20 0.03*** ln SPOcty3 0.1 0.02***
ln DPOcty4 −0.19 0.03*** ln SPOcty4 0.28 0.02***
ln DPOcty5 −0.40 0.04*** ln SPOcty5 0.48 0.02***
ln DPOcty6 0.11 0.01*** ln SPOcty6 −0.31 0.01***
ln DPNovy1 −0.39 0.03*** ln SPNovy1 0.62 0.02***
ln DPNovy2 0.24 0.02*** ln SPNovy2 −0.22 0.01***
ln DPNovy3 −0.18 0.03*** ln SPNovy3 0.19 0.02***
ln DPNovy4 −0.19 0.03*** ln SPNovy4 0.34 0.02***
ln DPNovy5 −0.60 0.04*** ln SPNovy5 0.47 0.03***
ln DPNovy6 0.21 0.01*** ln SPNovy6 −0.51 0.02***
ln DPDecy1 −0.27 0.03*** ln SPDecy1 0.61 0.03***
ln DPDecy2 0.28 0.02*** ln SPDecy2 −0.42 0.02***
ln DPDecy3 −0.30 0.03*** ln SPDecy3 0.33 0.02***
ln DPDecy4 −0.30 0.03*** ln SPDecy4 0.4 0.02***
ln DPDecy5 −0.78 0.04*** ln SPDecy5 0.62 0.02***
ln DPDecy6 0.20 0.02*** ln SPDecy6 −0.58 0.02***
ln DPJany1 0.19 0.03*** ln SPJany1 0.20 0.02***
ln DPJany2 0.19 0.02*** ln SPJany2 −0.28 0.01***
ln DPJany3 −0.27 0.03*** ln SPJany3 0.56 0.02***
ln DPJany4 −0.29 0.03*** ln SPJany4 0.49 0.02***
ln DPJany5 −0.45 0.03*** ln SPJany5 0.6 0.03***
ln DPJany6 0.01 0.02 ln SPJany6 −0.38 0.01***
ln DPFeby1 −0.03 0.03 ln SPFeby1 0.23 0.02***
ln DPFeby2 0.25 0.02*** ln SPFeby2 −0.35 0.02***
ln DPFeby3 −0.28 0.03*** ln SPFeby3 0.58 0.02***
ln DPFeby4 −0.36 0.03*** ln SPFeby4 0.61 0.02***
ln DPFeby5 −0.28 0.03*** ln SPFeby5 0.71 0.02***
ln DPFeby6 0.07 0.02*** ln SPFeby6 −0.34 0.02***
ln DPMary1 0.16 0.03*** ln SPMary1 −0.09 0.02***
ln DPMary2 0.06 0.02** ln SPMary2 −0.23 0.01***
ln DPMary3 −0.26 0.03*** ln SPMary3 0.72 0.02***
ln DPMary4 −0.37 0.03*** ln SPMary4 0.84 0.02***
ln DPMary5 −0.22 0.03*** ln SPMary5 0.63 0.02***
ln DPMary6 0.07 0.02*** ln SPMary6 −0.25 0.01***
ln DPApry1 0.03 0.03 ln SPApry1 0.08 0.01***
ln DPApry2 0.11 0.02*** ln SPApry2 −0.23 0.01***
ln DPApry3 −0.36 0.03*** ln SPApry3 0.64 0.02***
ln DPApry4 −0.37 0.03*** ln SPApry4 0.83 0.03***
ln DPApry5 −0.20 0.03*** ln SPApry5 0.51 0.02***
ln DPApry6 0.13 0.02*** ln SPApry6 −0.46 0.01***
ln DPMayy1 −0.02 0.03 ln SPMayy1 −0.10 0.02***Price elasticity of water allocations in the GMID 55
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ln DPMayy2 −0.30 0.03*** ln SPMayy2 −0.13 0.02***
ln DPMayy3 −0.79 0.04*** ln SPMayy3 1.10 0.03***
ln DPMayy4 −0.61 0.04*** ln SPMayy4 0.98 0.03***
ln DPMayy5 −1.08 0.06*** ln SPMayy5 1.05 0.03***
ln DPMayy6 −0.24 0.03*** ln SPMayy6 −0.88 0.02***
ln DPJuny3 −2.15 0.21*** ln SPJuny3 0.90 0.22***
ln DPJuny4 −1.13 0.05*** ln SPJuny4 −0.19 0.09**
ln DPJuny5 −1.97 0.86** ln SPJuny5 0.04 0.31
ln DPJuny6 −0.26 0.05*** ln SPJuny6 −0.95 0.05***
Constant 22.11 0.36*** Constant −2.16 0.25***




F test 303.42*** F test 302.54***
Notes: All models calculated with Huber–White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and
covariance and with bias correction best for heteroskedasticity. Due to collinearity problems, allocation
could not be used in the supply model, nor could months or years be included in either models.
***Signiﬁcant at 1% level. **Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Demand Bid Supply Bid
Variable Coefﬁcient SE Variable Coefﬁcient SE
Table A2 Continued